Tuesday, August 14, 2012

Inaugural Philosopost

This is what will hopefully be the first of many philosophy related posts on the blog. So fair warning, if you aren't interested in philosophy you may not want to read any further.

I though I could post briefly about the initial plans for the project I will be undertaking at Otago. My main interests in philosophy lie in metaphysics, specifically in the philosophy of time. One of the main positions in the philosophy of time is known as presentism, which in the roughest sense is basically the view that only the present exists. A major point in favor of presentism over alternate views is that it is the most commonsensical and fits our everyday notions of time better than its competitors. This has always interested me because it is an intuition that many philosophers seem to have, but one which I lack. So the main question in my project is to examine whether presentism really is as commonsensical as it is made out to be. I hope to examine this by using a method of metaphysics pioneered by Peter Strawson known as 'descriptive metaphysics.' This type of metaphysical analysis typically doesn't have a place at the philosophy of time table, but to me it seems the perfect starting point for the type of analysis I have in mind.

So my research is going to be broadly construed into four sections. I'm going to start by examining the state of the debate in the philosophy of time, with a particular focus on presentism and the problems/solutions offered by critics/defenders of the view. Next, I'm going to be examining the methodology offered by Strawson and like minded thinkers while also working to see if this methodology can be applied to the current debates in the philosophy of time. Thirdly, I hope to apply this methodology to temporal experience in an effort to analyze the structure of temporal thought. I then plan on seeing how presentism can fit into this analysis, and whether it remains as commonsensical as advertised. Finally, I'll work on drawing overall conclusions about what this means for the philosophy of time as a whole (if anything at all). I'm really excited about the project, and I'll be sure to keep readers of this blog updated as to my progress (and to the inevitable changes which will occur). Below I've copied the title and abstract from my paper proposal. Thoughts and comments are appreciated.


Presentism and Temporal Experience: Using Descriptive Metaphysics to Build a Complete Picture of Our Experience of Time 

Abstract: One of the strengths of presentism has been its supposed intuitive appeal and commonsensical nature. Solutions to many of the view’s problems however, such as questions regarding the rate of time’s passage and the grounding of past truths, move far beyond this supposed strength. In this paper I hope to use the methods of descriptive metaphysics to make clear the structure of temporal experience in regards to possible solutions for the problems facing presentism. One particular area that seems ripe for examination is the distinction between our phenomenal experience of time and our more objective experience of time. In examining this area I hope to arrive at a clearer picture of our coherent temporal experience. 


2 comments:

  1. Hi Darcy,

    Nice post! I think investigating why your intuitions differ from the "mainstream" intuiton is a great starting place. Here's my question..

    I am very sure that certain things in the past happened--the great depression in the 30s, my parents' birth in the 50s, etc. How does presentism account for the fact that those things exist in a very "real" way for me? If only the present exists, then the past doesn't exist, and if the past doesn't exist how can I make sense of my thoughts and intuitions about things I'm sure have passed?

    -Matt v

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    1. That is one of the main issues for presentism, if only the present exists (in the sense that all objects which exist are temporally present) how can we a) refer in a meaningful way to things that do not exist and b) ground truths about the past. I think there is an important distinction between our beliefs about the past, which are perfectly compatible with the presentist position, and what those beliefs refer to (some past event/object/person/etc). Presentist solutions to these problems usually come in a couple of flavors, most revolving around postulating something akin to 'abstract times,' the present containing a property or 'shape' of the past, or some sort of denial of a truth maker principle. There are some pretty interesting ones out there, and one of the things I'm hoping to explore is whether presentism can remain commonsensical if we have to build in a number of solutions to these problems.

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